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STUDENT NOTES
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW-THE NUANCES OF
NUISANCE IN A PRIVATE ACTION TO
CONTROL AIR POLLUTION
With a long-standing national policy favoring increase in gross
national product, it is not surprising that the affluent society has
concomitantly become the effluent society. The situation was sub-
tly depicted in Washchak v. Moffat' where the Pennsylvania Su-
preme Court, adopting language from a lower court, said:
"Without smoke, Pittsburgh would have remained a very pretty
village. '" Although environmental legislation, environmental ac-
tivism and public concern with the environment has increased
substantially during the last decade, industry continues to adulter-
ate the atmosphere. Government response, often slow and fraught
with conflicting interests, leaves the private citizen with the task
of attempting to alleviate the situation or suffering the effects of
silence. The individual willing to bear the burden of litigation in
pursuit of cleaner air will discover that a nuisance action is per-
haps the most powerful weapon available. In an effort to explore
the potentialities of a nuisance action for the private citizen
desirous of alleviating air pollution, this article will examine the
requirements for maintaining a successful nuisance -action, the
remedies available to the private citizen maintaining a nuisance
action, and the possible defenses which may be raised against a
nuisance action.
Air pollution was labeled a nuisance as early as 1611 in
William Alfred's Case3 where an injunction and damages were
awarded the plaintiff whose air was being adulterated by the de-
fendant's hog sty. The court found the defendant to be committing
a nuisance despite his pleading that the maintenance of hogs was
necessary for the sustenance of man and that a person should not
have so delicate a nose that he cannot bear the smell of hogs. The
court reasoned that since the law gave an action for air and light,
"a fortiori an action lies in the case at Bar for infecting and cor-
rupting the air."4 Since its debut in William Alfred's Case, nui-
1 379 Pa. 441, 109 A.2d 310 (1954).
2 Id. at 453, 109 A.2d at 316.
3 77 Eng. Rep. 816 (K.B. 1611).
Id. at 821.
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sance has played a leading role in environmental litigation, and
"it is probably the most widely relied upon theory used in envi-
ronmental actions today."5
A major problem with the theory of nuisance is its lack of
definitional clarity. As one commentator has stated, "There is per-
haps no more impenetrable jungle in the entire law than that
which surrounds the word 'nuisance'. It has meant all things to all
men . . . .There is general agreement that it is incapable of any
exact or comprehensive definition. "I Responsibility for much of the
confusion lies in the fact that nuisance has developed through a
series of accidents in order to deal with the invasions of different
kinds of interests and, necessarily, the various types of conduct
causing such invasions.' The majority view, however, regards nui-
sance as the invasion of a legal right s and "a field of tort liability,
rather than a type of tortious conduct. It has reference to the
interests invaded, to the damage or harm inflicted, and not to any
particular kind of act or omission which has led to the invasion."'
' Cartwright, Handling of Air and Water Pollution Cases by the Plaintiff, 9
FORUM 639, 642-43 (1973-74).
' W. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS § 86, at 571 (4th ed. 1971) [hereinafter cited
as PROSSER]; see Dep't of Environmental Quality v. Chemical Waste Storage &
Disposition, Inc., 19 Or. App. 712, 717, 528 P.2d 1076, 1079 (1974).
PROSSER, supra note 6, § 86, at 571-72.
E.g., Kay v. Pearliris Realty Corp., 106 N.Y.S.2d 443, 444 (Sup. Ct. 1951);
Sweet v. State, 195 Misc. 494, 500, 89 N.Y.S.2d 506, 514 (Ct. Cl. 1949).
PROSSER, supra note 6, § 87, at 573-74; see Durrance v. Sanders, 329 So. 2d
26, 29 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1976). "[A] negligent interference with the use and
enjoyment of land is private nuisance in respect to the interest invaded, and negli-
gence in respect to the type of conduct which causes the invasion." RESTATEMENT
OF TORTS, Scope and Introductory Note to Chapter 40, at 222 (1939).
Not all authorities are in agreement with this view, however. One view regards
nuisance as being no different from any other tort. Under this view, nuisance is
wrongful conduct which interferes with a public right or with the use and enjoyment
of land. Seavey, Nuisance: Contributory Negligence and Other Mysteries, 65 HARv.
L. REv. 984, 985 (1952). The limitation to the consequences of the conduct is not in
accordance with customary usage of other terms in the law of torts. Nuisance is
conduct followed by particular kinds of results. In an injunction against threatened
nuisance it is the conduct which is enjoined and not the consequences, although
the prohibition may be against the conduct which results in the consequences. Id.
at 985.
Another view regards nuisance as either the type of conduct resulting in a
particular kind of harm or the particular kind of harm incurred. 1 F. HARPER & F.
JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS § 1.24, at 72-73 (1956). And finally, nuisance has been
viewed as including "both the elements of wrongful conduct and the consequences
that must follow." Keeton, Trespass, Nuisance, and Strict Liability, 59 COLUM. L.
REv. 457, 464 (1959) (emphasis added). While the success of a nuisance action is
2
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Basically, nuisance is a term used to describe the invasion of
two distinct interests, private and public. Private nuisance was the
earliest theory relied upon in air pollution cases between private
litigants in the United States."° It is a civil wrong, involving an
interference with the use and enjoyment of land," and the remedy
for such an interference lies in the hands of the individual whose
rights have been disturbed.' 2 Such an invasion includes
"endangering the health and well being of the inhabitants of the
land as well as direct interference with economic use of the land
itself.' 3 But as private nuisance has developed over the years, it
"has tended to give greater protection to property interests than
to interests based on personal comfort or well being."" In each case
the action based on private nuisance is derived from, and the pro-
tection is limited to, the plaintiffs interest in land.'5
The concept of private nuisance works two ways, however, and
the policy of protecting the interest in the use and enjoyment of
land applies equally as well to the defendant. A court, therefore,
may be faced with recognizing the right of each party to use and
enjoy his property, subject to an identical right in the opposing
party.'" Thus, the law of private nuisance has been referred to as
"the dividing line between the right of any owner to use his prop-
erty as he so desires and the recognition of that right in another."' 7
A public nuisance is a "species of catch-all criminal offense, '"'
and "was always a common law crime."'" When common law
crimes were eliminated, and crimes became a matter of statute
dependent upon the proof of both a particular kind of harm and a particular type
of conduct creating that harm, it is difficult to conceptualize a nuisance as being
regarded as two distinct concepts at the same time, that is, both conduct and harm.
,o See Cogswell v. New York, N.H. & H.R.R., 103 N.Y. 10, 8 N.E. 537 (1886).
" Baldwin v. McClendon, 292 Ala. 43, 48, 288 So.2d 761, 764 (1974); Winget
v. Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc., 242 S.C. 152, 159, 130 S.E.2d 363, 367 (1963); Prosser,
Nuisance Without Fault, 20 TEX. L. Rv. 399, 411 (1942).
,2 PROSSER, supra note 6, § 86, at 572-73.
'" Schuck, Air Pollution as a Private Nuisance, 3 NAT. RESOURCES LAW 475, 476
(1970).
Id.
,5 Culwell v. Abbott Constr. Co., 211 Kan. 359, 362, 506 P.2d 1191, 1194 (1973);
PROSSER, supra note 6, § 89, at 593.
, Winget v. Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc., 242 S.C. 152, 159, 130 S.E.2d 363, 367
(1963); PROSSER, supra note 6, § 89, at 596.
" Roberts v. C.F. Adams & Son, 199 Okla. 369, 371, 184 P.2d 634, 637 (1947).
" PROSSER, supra note 6, § 86, at 573.
" PROSSER, supra note 6, § 88, at 586.
[Vol. 80
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only, broad criminal statutes were enacted in most states provid-
ing criminal penalties for public nuisances. These statutes either
made no attempt to define public nuisance or at best defined it in
a rather broad or nebulous fashion and have been uniformly con-
strued to include the same interferences with rights of the public
that would have been public nuisances at common law."0 Public
nuisance does not, however, embody the typical criminal charac-
teristics inherent in other statutorily defined crimes."
Generally speaking, a public nuisance involves an interference
with an interest common to the general public as opposed to an
interest peculiar to one or more individuals.2 "It is not necessary,
however, that the entire community be affected, so long as the
nuisance will interfere with those who come in contact with it in
the exercise of a public right."' Even though a number of interfer-
ences with private rights will not add up to a public nuisance,24 any
activity that substantially interferes with the private interests of
a considerable number of persons in a community will normally
also interfere with some public right."
As possible causes of action to alleviate air pollution problems,
private and public nuisance have little or nothing in common ex-
cept that each involves the elements of harm, inconvenience or
21 Prosser, Private Action for Public Nuisance, 52 VA. L. REv. 997, 999 (1966);
see, e.g., Smejkal v. Empire Lite-Rock, Inc., 547 P.2d 1363, 1367-68 (Or. 1976).
23 See Bryson & Macbeth, Public Nuisance, the Restatement (Second) of
Torts, and Environmental Law, 2 ECOLOGY L.Q. 241, 247 (1972) [hereinafter cited
as Bryson & MacBeth].
2 E.g., Ozark Poultry Prods. v. Garman, 472 S.W.2d 714, 715-16 (Ark. 1971);
City of Chicago v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 24 Ill. App. 3d 624, 631, 321 N.E.2d
412, 418 (1974); PROSSER, supra note 6, § 88, at 585; Schuck, Air Pollution as a
Private Nuisance, 3 NAT. RESoURcES LAW. 475, 477 (1970).
" PROSSER, supra note 6, § 88, at 585; RESTATEMENT (SEcOND) OF TORTS § 821B,
Comment g (Tent. Draft No. 17, 1971).
24 Costas v. City of Fond Du Lac, 24 Wis. 2d 409, 414, 129 N.W.2d 217, 220
(1964) ("The test is not the number of persons injured but the character . . . of
the right impinged upon.").
"It should be noted, however, that in some states there are statutes defining a
public nuisance to include interference with 'any considerable number of persons;'
and under these statutes no public right, as such, need be involved." RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 821B, Comment g (Tent. Draft No. 17, 1971).
21 Prosser, Private Action for Public Nuisance, 52 VA. L. REv. 997, 1002 (1966).
"Thus the pollution of a stream which merely affects a large number of riparian
owners is a private nuisance only; but it becomes a public one when it kills the
fish." Id. at 1001.
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annoyance to someone which exist in all tort liabilities."6 Much of
the confusion inherent in the concept of nuisance today could have
been avoided had public and private nuisance been called by dif-
ferent names from the beginning. 7 The use of the word nuisance
to describe both, however, has resulted in the application of the
same rules, with minor differences, to each. 8
STANDING
While a private nuisance action is maintainable by a private
citizen, the general rule is that a private individual lacks standing
to maintain a private action for a public nuisance." The primary
reason proffered for this rule is the fear of a multiplicity of suits"
as expressed in Blackstone:
[Public] nuisances are such inconvenient or troublesome of-
fenses as annoy the whole community in general, and not
merely some particular person, and therefore are . . . not ac-
tionable; as it would be unreasonable to multiply suits by giving
every man a separate right of action for what damnifies him in
common only with the rest of his fellow-subjects.2
This argument proves less persuasive, however, where injunctive
relief is sought, which is the situation with the majority of public
nuisance cases involving air pollution. 2 In addition, denying a pri-
vate citizen standing to sue for a public nuisance in order to elimi-
nate air pollution might very well generate duplication of litigation
where the only action available to a private citizen may be a man-
damus action against a public official to force him to institute
actions against a defendant causing the public nuisance.33
26 Id.; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, Scope and Introductory Note to
Chapter 40, at 6 (Tent. Draft No. 16, 1970).
PROSSER, supra note 6, § 86, at 573. Because of the amount of confusion
caused in distinguishing public and private nuisances, a more appropriate term for
public nuisance would be a "public misdemeanor." Schuck, Air Pollution as a
Private Nuisance, 3 NAT. RESOURCES LAW. 475, 478 (1970).
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, Scope and Introductory Note to Chapter
40, at 6 (Tent. Draft No. 16, 1970).
" PROSSER, supra note 6, § 88 at 586.
0 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821C, Comment a (Tent. Draft No. 17,
1971); Bryson & Macbeth, supra note 21, at 253.
3' 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES * 167.
3 See Bryson & Macbeth, supra note 21, at 260.
3 Bryson & Macbeth, supra note 21, at 255.
A mandamus action, however, might not be available to private citizens to
force action by public officials in the absence of statutory provisions to the contrary.
[Vol. 80
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The second reason often espoused for denying a private action
for a public nuisance is the likelihood that parties will bring ac-
tions for minimal damages." This argument is enervated, however,
by the fact that "the expense and vexation of legal proceedings is
not lightly undertaken."35
A plaintiff should not be discouraged from bringing a private
action for a public nuisance, however, since he may fall within the
exception to the general rule denying standing by proving that he
has suffered some special injury or particular damage not incurred
by the public generally. 6 While authorities are in disagreement as
to what constitutes a special injury,37 the majority view regards a
special injury as an injury suffered by the plaintiff which is differ-
ent in kind rather than in degree from that suffered by other mem-
bers of the public exercising the same public right.38 An injury
Boger, The Common Law of Public Nuisance in State Environmental Litigation, 4
ENVT'L AFF. 367, 378 (1975). At least one state has such a statute. Id. at 391 n.110;
see FLA. STAT. ANN. § 403.412(2)(a) (1973).
31 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821C, Comment a (Tent. Draft No. 17,
1971); Bryson & Macbeth, supra note 21, at 253.
1 Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference v. FPC, 354 F.2d 608, 617 (2d Cir.
1965). "Private litigants with sufficient funds to bring private actions may not
abound." Van Doren, Air Pollution Expanding Citizens Remedies, 32 OHIO ST. L.J.
16, 29 (1971).
38 See, e.g., PROSSER, supra note 6, § 88, at 586; Venuto v. Owens-Corning
Fiberglass Corp., 22 Cal. App. 3d 116, 123, 99 Cal. Rptr. 350, 355 (1971); Smejkal
v. Empire Lite-Rock, Inc., 547 P.2d 1363, 1365 (Or. 1976).
31 Compare PROSSER, supra note 6, § 88, at 587-88 with Rothstein, Private
Actions for Public Nuisance: The Standing Problem, 76 W. VA. L. REv. 453 (1974).
Essentially the controversy has centered upon whether the plaintiff must show
that he has suffered an injury different in kind, different in degree, or both.
Prosser represents the majority view which requires an injury different in kind.
If the injury is greater in degree only, then the plaintiff lacks standing. PROSSER,
supra note 6, § 88, at 587-88.
Prosser suggests that a good reason for not including a degree test as a separate
type of special injury is because of the difficulty in "fixing any lines of demarcation
in terms of 'degree' of public damage." PROSSER, supra note 6, § 88, at 587. Such a
task, however, appears to be no more difficult than drawing the precise line which
separates an injury which is different in kind from that suffered by the general
public.
Rothstein espouses the degree test and has found at least two jurisdictions
which require the plaintiff to prove that he has suffered an injury which is both
different in kind and different in degree, and he refers to such a prerequisite as the
most stringent standing rule. Rothstein, supra, at 457; see Clabaugh v. Harris, 27
Ohio Misc. 153, 155-56, 273 N.E.2d 923, 925 (C.P. 1971); International Shoe Co. v.
Heatwole, 126 W. Va. 888, 892, 30 S.E.2d 537, 540 (1944).
38 PROSSER, supra note 6, § 88, at 587; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821C
6
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suffered by the plaintiff which is greater in degree from that suf-
fered by the general public is not, by itself, sufficient to entitle him
to a private action for a public nuisance. 9 The difference in the
degree of the injury, however, cannot be entirely ignored when it
has a bearing upon whether or not there has been suffered an injury
which is different in kind. A plaintiff who exercises a public right
extraordinarily more than the general public usually has a special
reason for doing so, and that reason invariably amounts to a differ-
ent kind of interest in the public right, the injury of which satisfies
the special injury rule."
A plaintiff may establish injury which is different in kind by
demonstrating that the public nuisance has resulted in: (1) per-
sonal injury to the plaintiff;4 ' (2) physical harm to the plaintiff's
land;" (3) particular pecuniary loss to the plaintiff;43 or (4) some
other injury peculiar to the plaintiff and not shared by the general
public in the exercise of a public right." When a public nuisance
interferes with the use and enjoyment of a plaintiffs land, he has
sustained a special injury and may either bring a private action for
a public nuisance or proceed under a private nuisance action. 5
(Tent. Draft No. 17, 1971); see, e.g., Monsanto Chem. Co. v. Fincher, 272 Ala. 534,
536, 133 So. 2d 192, 194 (1961); Karpisek v. Cather & Sons Constr., Inc., 174 Neb.
234, 240, 241, 117 N.W.2d 322, 326-27 (1962).
' PROSSER, supra note 6, § 88, at 587-88; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §
821C, Comment b (Tent. Draft No. 17, 1971).
," PROSSER, supra note 6, § 88, at 588; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821C,
Comment c (Tent. Draft No. 17, 1971).
1' RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821C, Comment d (Tent. Draft No. 17,
1971); Rothstein, Private Actions for Public Nuisance: The Standing Problem, 76
W. VA. L. REv. 453, 459-60 (1974); see, e.g., George v. City of Houston, 465 S.W.2d
387, 392 (Tex. Civ. App. 1971), rev'd on other grounds, 479 S.W.2d 257 (Tex. 1972).
" PROSSER, supra note 6, § 88, at 588; Rothstein, Private Actions for Public
Nuisance: The Standing Problem, 76 W. VA. L. REV. 453, 460 (1974); see Karpisek
v. Cather & Sons Constr. Inc., 174 Neb. 234, 241, 117 N.W.2d 322, 326-27 (1962).
This position derives from the common law emphasis on the protection of property
rights and the common law fiction that each piece of land is unique.
13 PROSSER, supra note 6, § 88, at 590-91; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §
821C, Comment h (Tent. Draft No. 17, 1971); see Spur Indus., Inc. v. Del E. Webb
Dev. Co., 108 Ariz. 178, 184, 494 P.2d 700, 706 (1972). Plaintiff's pecuniary loss must
be particular to the plaintiff and not so general or widespread as to affect the entire
public. Prosser, Private Action for Public Nuisance, 52 VA. L. REv. 997, 1015 (1966).
See generally PROSSER, supra note 6, § 88, at 588-91.
, City of Monticello v. Rankin, 521 S.W.2d 79, 80-81 (Ky. 1975); PROSSER,
supra note 6, § 88, at 58-9; Rothstein, Private Actions for Public Nuisance: The
Standing Problem, 76 W. VA. L. REV. 453, 460 (1974); see, e.g., Costas v. City of
Fond Du Lac, 24 Wis. 2d 409, 413-14, 129 N.W.2d 217, 219-20 (1964).
[Vol. 80
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This situation, where the plaintiff has the opportunity to proceed
under either private nuisance or public nuisance, has been referred
to as a mixed nuisance.46 Although the plaintiff may proceed under
either theory, public nuisance may be preferable since it is well
settled that prescriptive rights, the statute of limitations and
laches do not run against it as they do against a private nuisance.47
The unanimous agreement among jurisdictions about some
form of special injury as a prerequisite to a private action for a
public nuisance was challenged recently in the Florida courts in
the case of Save Sand Key, Inc. v. United States Steel Corp.4" The
plaintiff, a nonprofit citizens' group, brought suit to enjoin the
defendant from interfering with certain alleged vested prescriptive
rights of its members shared in common with the public in a por-
tion of the beach area of Sand Key. The trial court dismissed the
plaintiff's claim on the ground that the plaintiff lacked standing
to sue by failing to demonstrate a special injury. The district court
of appeals reversed the plaintiff's dismissal, and after recognizing
the trend in expanding standing to parties except in nuisance cases
impugned the special injury rule.49 Rather than succumb to the
traditional argument that a multiplicity of suits would result from
permitting plaintiff to bring a private action for a public nuisance
without the traditional requisite showing of a special injury, the
appellate court recognized four practical considerations debilitat-
ing the argument: (1) the deterring economic influence of the high
cost of litigation; (2) the precedential value of a prior decided case
on a given issue; (3) the increasing number of class actions in
which inheres the doctrine of res judicata; and (4) the fact that
spite or harassment suits will not be tolerated by the courts."
The district court's rejection of the special injury rule was
short lived, however, as the Supreme Court of Florida quashed the
decision of the district court and remanded the case with directions
to reinstate the order of the trial court.5 ' The supreme court con-
demned the district court's divergence from such a well established
"' Bishop Processing Co. v. Davis, 213 Md. 465, 472, 132 A.2d 445, 448 (1957);
Deason v. Southern Ry., 142 S.C. 328, 335, 140 S.E. 575, 577 (1927).
"' PROSSER, supra note 6, § 88, at 589; see, e.g., Wade v. Campbell, 200 Cal.
App. 2d 54, 61, 19 Cal. Rptr. 173, 177 (1962).
"' 281 So. 2d 572 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1973), appeal dismissed mem. 286 So. 2d
206 (Fla. 1973), rev'd, 303 So. 2d 9 (Fla. 1973).
, Id. at 574-75.
Id. at 575.
, 303 So. 2d 9 (Fla. 1974).
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area of the law, without rebutting any of the reasons for change
offered by the district court.2
A few states have enacted statutes permitting individuals to
sue on behalf of the state as private attorneys general to enjoin
public nuisances.5 3 "In the absence of such statutory authorization,
no case has been found in which a private individual has been held
to have standing to sue for a public nuisance in the absence of a
particular damage to him." 5
A potential avenue available to the private litigant desirous of
instituting a public nuisance action is the class action. In theory,
class action procedures offer potentially significant contributions
to the success of public nuisance actions since public nuisances
invariably affect a group or class of persons. A class action proce-
dure expunges the traditional arguments supporting denial of a
private action for a public nuisance.5 The res judicata effect of a
class action militates against the fear of a multiplicity of suits,5"
and the likelihood of actions for only minimal damages is less-
ened.57 A significant feature of the class action in the area of nuis-
ance law is its emphasis on the aggregate interests of plaintiff class
members when the court resorts to balancing the equities.
Although the great potential of the class action in environ-
mental litigation has been noted by one commentator," class ac-
tions based on public nuisance theory, in practice, have been far
from successful."0 Two reasons have been offered for the apparent
lack of success. First, in order to recover damages class members
s' Id. at 11-13.
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 60.05(1) (Supp. 1977); MICH. CoMP. LAWS §§ 691.1201-
.1207 (Supp. 1972); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 823.02 (1977); see Comment, The Environ.
mental Lawsuit: Traditional Doctrines and Evolving Theories to Control Pollution,
16 WAYNE L. REv. 1085, 1127-31 (1970).
5 PROSSER, supra note 6, § 88, at 587 n.68.
See text accompanying notes 30-35 supra.
' Doren, Air Pollution Expanding Citizens Remedies, 32 OHIO ST. L.J. 16, 28
(1971).
11 See generally Schuck, Air Pollution as a Private Nuisance, 3 NAT. RESOURCES
LAW. 475 (1970).
51 See text accompanying notes 85-118 infra.
" See Note, The Viability of Class Actions in Environmental Litigation, 2
ECOLOGY L.Q. 533 (1972).
"0 See generally Note, Developments in the Law of Federal Class Litigation-
Catch 22 in Rule 23, 10 Hous. L. REv. 337 (1973).
[Vol. 80
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must overcome the barrier created by the special injury rule.'
Secondly, the plaintiff must satisfy all of the requirements for
maintaining a class action. 2 Illustrative of the difficulties inherent
in satisfying these requirements is the Supreme Court's decision
in Zahn v. International Paper Co., 3 which has drained much of
the vitality out of environmental class actions in federal courts by
requiring each class member to satisfy the jurisdictional amount."
A rather unique case pointing out some of the problems with
satisfying the requirements for maintaining a class action in envi-
ronmental litigation is Diamond v. General Motors Corp.65 In
Diamond the plaintiff brought a class action on behalf of 7,119,184
residents of the County of Los Angeles against 293 industrial corpo-
rations and municipalities and additional unknown persons as de-
fendants. The complaint, relying on theories of public nuisance,
trespass, negligence, and strict liability, sought billions of dollars
in damages and an injunction restraining the defendants from fur-
ther pollution emission. The plaintiff alleged that the class mem-
bers suffered "shortening of life span; increased chances of suffer-
ing heart attack; emphysema; lung cancer; damage to and destruc-
tion of body tissue; eye irritation; brain damage; exhaustion due
to lack of oxygen; fatigue, and many other injuries.""6 Although
several orders of dismissal were made by the trial court, separately
dismissing the action with respect to certain defendants, the ap-
pellate court reviewed the judgment upon the original record be-
fore the trial court. Affirming the judgment of the trial court, the
appellate court listed three reasons why a class action could not
be maintained: (1) there were significantly distinct interests
within the alleged class; (2) the right of each class member to
recover was dependent upon substantial issues which had to be
litigated between individual plaintiffs and defendants; and (3) the
large number of parties involved, the diversity of their interests,
and the immensity of issues all in one action made the proceeding
unmanageable .
6 7
1, Rothstein, Private Actions for Public Nuisance: The Standing Problem, 76
W. VA. L. REv. 453, 471 (1974).
62 Id.
414 U.S. 291 (1973).
11 "Each plaintiff in a Rule 23(b) (3) class action must satisfy the jurisdictional
amount, and any plaintiff who does not must be dismissed from the case .
Id. at 301.
65 20 Cal. App. 3d 374, 97 Cal. Rptr. 639 (1971).
66 Id. at 380 n.7, 97 Cal. Rptr. at 644 n.7.
67 Id. at 379-80, 97 Cal. Rptr. at 642.
10
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Summarizing the standing situation under public nuisance, it
appears that the problems inherent in maintaining a class action
proceeding and the application of the special injury rule to class
actions seeking damages leave the special injury rule, in most
cases, as the only potential avenue of standing available to the
private citizen seeking relief for a public nuisance. The special
injury rule, however, is an impediment to any recovery under a
private action for a public nuisance. Continued support for the
special injury rule is found only in its historical roots. While other
areas of the law have submitted to logic and espoused more liberal
rules of standing,68 the special injury rule remains an isolated bar-
rier to the progressive development of rules of standing in the area
of public nuisance: 9
Complexities about standing are barriers to justice; in re-
moving the barriers the emphasis should be on the needs of
justice. One whose legitimate interest is in fact injured by ille-
gal action of an agency or officer should have standing because
justice requires that such a party should have a chance to show
that the action that hurts his interest is illegal. 0
BASIS OF LIABILITY FOR NUISANCE
Liability for private nuisance results only when the defen-
dant's conduct results in an invasion of the plaintiff's interest in
the use and enjoyment of land and when the invasion is either
intentional and unreasonable or unintentional and otherwise ac-
tionable under principles governing liability for negligence, reck-
lessness or abnormally dangerous activities.7 ' Subject to exceptions
where liability is created by special statutes which may be re-
garded as a legislative declaration of unreasonableness, liability for
public nuisance may rest upon either intentional conduct, negli-
" See Davis, The Liberalized Law of Standing, 37 U. CHI. L. REv. 450 (1970);
Jaffe, Standing Again, 84 HARV. L. REV. 633 (1971). See generally Sierra Club v.
Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972); Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968); Baker v. Carr, 369
U.S. 186 (1961).
11 A liberalization of standing for public nuisance would obviate the need for
plaintiffs and courts to distort and mutilate factual situations and remedies so as
to enable a case to fall within the property-protection pale of private nuisance.
Bryson & Macbeth, supra note 21, at 276.
o Davis, The Liberalized Law of Standing, 37 U. Cm. L. REV. 450, 473 (1970).
E.g., Folmar v. Elliot Coal Mining Co., 441 Pa. 592, 596, 272 A.2d 910, 912
(1971); Harless v. Workman, 145 W. Va. 266, 275, 114 S.E.2d 548, 553 (1960);
PROSSER, supra note 6, § 87, at 574; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 822 (Tent.
Draft No. 17, 1971).
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gence or strict liability, provided the invasion causes substantial
harm.7"
An invasion of another's interest is intentional when the de-
fendant acts for the purpose of causing the invasion or knows that
it is resulting or substantially certain to result from his conduct.
7 3
Most air pollution nuisances are continuing or recurrent in na-
ture. 4 As a result, the majority of air pollution nuisances are inten-
tional since the defendant either originally intends the invasion or
is aware that the invasion is resulting from his activity.75
With regard to unintentional invasions of another's interests,
certain broad principles of liability have been developed and are
embodied in the rules governing liability for negligent, reckless and
abnormally dangerous conduct. 76 Each of these bases of liability
carries an element of unreasonableness as a prerequisite to render-
ing it actionable.77 Since there is no element of unreasonableness
inherent in the concept of an intentional invasion, it is added as a
prerequisite to rendering an intentional invasion actionable78 in
order to permit those intentional invasions which are reasonable.
7
1
Although the concept of unreasonableness with regard to an
intentional invasion of another's interest is analogous to the con-
cept of unreasonable risk under the law of negligence, they are
different in one important respect." The concept of unreasonable
risk conveys the idea of a foreseeable threat of harm created by the
conduct of the defendant of such a character that a reasonable
person would not subject others to such a risk."' Unreasonableness,
under the law of nuisance, however, deals with the character and
72 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 822, Comment a (Tent. Draft No. 17,
1971); Prosser, Private Action for Public Nuisance, 52 VA. L. REv. 997, 1003 (1966).
13 E.g., Riter v. Keokuk Electro-Metals Co., 248 Iowa 710, 721, 82 N.W.2d 151,
158 (1957); Watts v. Pama Mfg. Co., 256 N.C. 611, 616, 124 S.E.2d 809, 813 (1962);
RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 825 (1939).
T RESTATEMENT OF ToRTS § 825, Comment b (1939).
" Id.; Prosser, Nuisance Without Fault, 20 TEx. L. REv. 399, 416 (1942).
7' RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 822, Comment g (Tent. Draft No. 17,
1971).
" Id. Comment h.
76 See id. Comment g.
' See text accompanying notes 84-88 infra.
" 1 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS § 1.24, at 72-73 (1956). See
generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 822, Comment h (Tent. Draft No. 17,
1971).
11 1 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS § 1.24, at 72 (1956).
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extent of the harm caused rather than that threatened.2 Thus, a
nuisance may consist of an unreasonable interference with the in-
terests of another which causes harm, even though the defendant
has created no unreasonable risk, as the latter concept is developed
in the law of negligence.1
3
Drawing the line between what is a reasonable interference
and an unreasonable interference is a difficult task. Life in modern
society involves an unavoidable clash of individual interests since
nearly all human activities interfere to some extent with others or
at least involve some risk of interference. Each individual must be
expected to endure some inconvenience rather than curtail the
freedom of action of others. The law of nuisance, therefore, is very
largely a series of adjustments and compromises limiting the rights
and privileges of individuals. 4 The process of reaching a level of
activity which will permit two or more individuals to conduct their
respective affairs without unduly interfering with the other, or
others, is known as "balancing the equities."" The process of
balancing the equities, in order to determine whether an inva-
sion is unreasonable, involves weighing the utility of the defen-
dant's conduct against the gravity of the resulting harm to the
plaintiff.88 This weighing process involves "a comparative evalua-
tion of conflicting interests in various situations according to objec-
tive legal standards"87 and applies equally well to both private and
public nuisance.
Various factors which are conducive toward a determination
that an interference with a public right is unreasonable include
those circumstances where the conduct involves the same kind of
interference with the public health, safety, peace or convenience
which constituted the common law crime of public nuisance. 9 In
I3 d. at 73.
'Id.
Robichaux v. Huppenbauer, 258 La. 139, 149-50, 245 So. 2d 385, 389 (1971);
Watts v. Parna Mfg. Co., 256 N.C. 611, 619, 124 S.E.2d 809, 815 (1962);
RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 822, Comment j (1939).
1 F. GRAD, TREATISE ON ENVIRONMENTAL LAW § 2.02, at 2-23 (1977).
" Associated Metals & Minerals Corp. v. Dixon Chem. & Research, Inc., 82
N.J. Super. 281, 303, 197 A.2d 569, 581 (1962); Harless v. Workman, 145 W. Va.
266, 275, 114 S.E.2d 548, 553 (1960).
'3 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 826, Comment c (Tent. Draft No. 17,
1971); Associated Metals & Minerals Corp. v. Dixon Chem. & Research, Inc., 82
N.J. Super. 281, 303, 197 A.2d 569, 581 (1962).
Bryson & Macbeth, supra note 21, at 265 n.14.
'3 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821B(2)(a) (Tent. Draft No. 17, 1971).
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Board of Commissioners v. Elm Grove Mining Co.,"° the plaintiff,
Board of Ohio County, was seeking to abate a public nuisance
affecting the public health which was created by the defendant.
The nuisance was a burning gob pile which was located outside
one of the defendant's mines and which exuded sulphur dioxide
in quantities deleterious to the health of the community. While
affirming the trial court's finding that the gaseous emanations
from the burning gob pile constituted a public nuisance, the West
Virginia Supreme Court emphasized the importance of the public
health factor in the balancing process:
[P]ublic health comes first. Even in as useful and important
industry as the mining of coal, an incidental consequence, such
as here involved, cannot be justified or permitted unqualifiedly,
if the health of the public is impaired thereby.
Notwithstanding a business be conducted in the regular
manner, yet if in the operation thereof, it is shown by facts and
circumstances to constitute a nuisance affecting public health
"no measure of necessity, usefulness or public benefit will pro-
tect it from the unflinching condemnation of the law."9'
When determining whether an interference with a public right
is unreasonable, a circumstance which may very likely eliminate
the need to apply the balancing process occurs where the defen-
dant's conduct is proscribed by a statute, ordinance or administra-
tive regulation. All of the states have various statutes declaring
certain conduct or conditions to be public nuisances because they
interfere with rights of the general public, and these statutes
amount to a legislative declaration that the conduct or condition
proscribed amounts to an unreasonable interference with a public
right. " Such statutes are conclusive as to the reasonableness of the
defendant's interference. 4
With respect to the law of private nuisance there are four
primary factors important in determining the gravity of harm re-
sulting from an intentional invasion of another's interest in the use
and enjoyment of land, although the list is not exhaustive of all the
factors which may have a bearing on the harm involved:
5
' 122 W. Va. 442, 9 S.E.2d 813 (1940).
" Id. at 451, 9 S.E.2d at 817. See also United States v. Reserve Mining Co.,
380 F. Supp. 11, 55-56 (D. Minn. 1974).
9z RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821B(2)(b) (Tent. Draft No. 17, 1971).
'3 Id. Comment c.
" Id.
'5 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRTS § 827, Comment f (Tent. Draft No. 17,
1971).
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1. "[T]he extent of the harm involved":" this consideration
is dependent upon the degree and duration of the interference. 7
2. "[T]he character of the harm involved":" the character
of the harm is interrelated with the consideration of the extent of
the harm. Where the invasion involves physical damages to prop-
erty, the gravity of the harm is usually considered great even
though the extent of the harm is relatively slight. But where the
invasion involves only personal discomfort, annoyance or inconve-
nience, the gravity of the harm is generally regarded as slight un-
less the extent of the harm is substantial and continuing.
9
3. "[The social value which the law attaches to the type
of use or enjoyment invaded":'" how much social value will be
attached to the type of use or enjoyment invaded will depend upon
the extent to which such use or enjoyment advances or protects the
general public good.'0
4. "[Tlhe suitability of the particular use or enjoyment in-
vaded to the character of the locality":' 2 sound public policy de-
mands that land be used for purposes best suited to the character
of that locality, and that persons desiring to make use of land
should do so in a locality best suited for that particular use.' 3 The
better suited a particular use is with regard to a particular locality,
0 E.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TorS (Tent. Draft No. 17, 1971); Associated
Metals & Minerals Corp. v. Dixon Chem. & Research, Inc., 82 N.J. Super. 281, 303,
197 A.2d 569, 581 (1962); Evans v. Moffat, 192 Pa. Super. Ct. 204, 220, 160 A.2d
465, 472 (1960).
'" E.g., Associated Metals & Minerals Corp. v. Dixon Chem. & Research, Inc.,
82 N.J. Super. 281, 303, 197 A.2d 569, 581 (1962); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRTS
§ 827, Comment b (Tent. Draft No. 17, 1971).
" RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 827 (Tent. Draft No. 17, 1971); Associated
Metals & Minerals Corp. v. Dixon Chem. & Research, Inc., 82 N.J. Super. 281, 303,
197 A.2d 569, 581 (1962).
9 Jost v. Dairyland Power Coop., 45 Wis. 2d 164, 172, 172 N.W.2d 647, 651
(1969).
110 E.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRTs § 827 (Tent. Draft No. 17, 1971);
Associated Metals & Minerals Corp. v. Dixon Chem. & Research, Inc., 82 N.J.
Super. 281, 303, 197 A.2d 569, 581 (1962).
" E.g., Associated Metals & Minerals Corp. v. Dixon Chem. & Research, Inc.,
82 N.J. Super. 281, 304, 197 A.2d 569, 581 (1962).
"I E.g., RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 827 (Tent. Draft No. 17, 1971);
Watts v. Pama Mfg. Co., 256 N.C. 611, 618, 124 S.E.2d 809, 814 (1962); Associated
Metals & Minerals Corp. v. Dixon Chem. & Research, Inc., 82 N.J. Super. 281, 303,
197 A.2d 569, 581 (1962).
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the greater is the gravity of harm resulting from any interference
with that use.' 0' The character or nature of a locality is not fixed,
however, and is likely to change over time. What may have been
suitable for a particular locality in the past may no longer be so at
the present. Thus, the suitability of a particular use or enjoyment
of land to its locality is determined at the time of the invasion
rather than at the time the use or enjoyment began."5
The various factors which are important in determining the
utility of conduct which causes an intentional invasion of another's
interest in the use and enjoyment of land and which are to be
weighed against the factors involved in determining the gravity of
harm include the following:
1. "[T]he social value which the law attaches to the pri-
mary purpose of the conduct":' the amount of social value which
is attached to the primary purpose of the defendant's activity is
the primary factor in determining the amount of social utility the
defendant's conduct embodies.0 7 The defendant's conduct has so-
cial value if it in some way advances or protects the general public
good. ' 8 Since there is no universal standard by which courts can
measure the amount of social value embodied in the primary pur-
pose of the defendant's conduct, they should consider the com-
munity standards of relative social Value prevailing at the time of
the invasion in addition to what has traditionally been regarded
as the relative social value of various types of human conduct.'
2. "[T]he suitability of the conduct to the character of the
locality":10 certain areas, by reason of either their physical charac-
ter or the accident of community growth, are devoted to certain
activities. Incompatible areas, such as industrial and residential
areas, are usually segregated from one another in order to avoid
101 Id.
'D5 Id.
101 E.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 828 (Tent. Draft No. 17, 1971);
Traiteur v. Abbott, 27 Ill. App. 3d 277, 282, 327 N.E.2d 130, 134 (1975); Louisville
Ref. Co. v. Mudd, 339 S.W.2d 181, 186, 187 (Ky. 1960).
"I RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 828, Comment a (Tent. Draft No. 17,
1971).
I" Id. Comment d. Most pollution producing activities have some social value,
therefore, it is unlikely that this particular factor will be very helpful to plaintiffs.
109 Id. Comment e; see Traiteur v. Abbott, 27 Ill App. 3d 277, 282, 327 N.E.2d
130, 134 (1975).
11o RESTATEMENT (SEcOND) OF TORTS § 828 (Tent. Draft No. 17, 1971); see, e.g.,
Fuchs v. Curran Carbonizing & Eng'r Co., 279 S.W.2d 211, 218 (Mo. Ct. App. 1955).
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unnecessary conflict.'" Thus, a plaintiff will be in a precarious
position to complain of industrial pollution when he locates his
home in the center of a manufacturing district."2 On the other
hand, a corporation cannot expect to locate a factory in a residen-
tial section without possibly being subject to liability for creating
a nuisance."' Courts, forced to determine the paramount use to
which a locality is devoted, are engaging in a process of judicial
zoning."4 In those areas where the use of land is subject to zoning
ordinances, however, the question of reasonable use may be moot
by reason of statutory predetermination."5
3. "Whether it is impracticable to prevent or avoid the inva-
sion, if the activity is maintained":"' an invasion is practicably
avoidable if the defendant can substantially reduce or eliminate
the harm without incurring prohibitive expense or hardship. But
where the defendant would be forced to abandon his activity or
incur substantial expense or hardship to reduce the harm materi-
ally, the invasion is not practicably avoidable."'
A defendant cannot rely on any single one of the above factors
weighed in determining the utility of his conduct, for it is only
when his conduct has utility with respect to all of these factors that
its merit will ever be sufficient to outweigh the gravity of the harm
it causes."' For example, a defendant operating a manufacturing
plant with substantial social value in an industrial district may,
nevertheless, be liable under the law of nuisance if it is practicable
for that defendant to eliminate unnecessary pollution emissions
without incurring substantial expense.
"' PRossER, supra note 6, § 89, at 599; see, e.g., Riter v. Keokuk Electro-Metals
Co., 248 Iowa 710, 721, 82 N.W.2d 151, 158 (1957).
112 See, e.g., Grzelka v. Chevrolet Motor Car Co., 286 Mich. 141, 281 N.W. 568
(1938); Pelletier v. Transit-Mix Concrete Corp., 11 Misc. 2d 617, 623-24, 174
N.Y.S.2d 794, 800-02 (Sup. Ct. 1958).
"I See, e.g., Traiteur v. Abbott, 27 Ill. App. 3d 277, 282, 327 N.E.2d 130, 134
(1975); Schlotfelt v. Vinton Farmers' Supply Co., 252 Iowa 1102, 1109, 109 N.W.2d
695, 699 (1961).
'" PRoSSER, supra note 6, § 89, at 600; see Dill v. Excel Packing Co., 183 Kan.
513, 525-26, 331 P.2d 539, 548-49 (1958).
"I Green v. Castle Concrete Co., 509 P.2d 588 (Colo. 1973).
"' E.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TomRS § 828 (Tent. Draft No. 17, 1971);
Evans v. Moffat, 192 Pa. Super. Ct. 204, 219, 220, 160 A.2d 465, 472, 473 (1960).
" RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF Toirrs § 828, Comment g (Tent. Draft No. 17,
1971); see Folmar v. Elliot Coal Mining Co., 441 Pa. 592, 596-97, 272 A.2d 910, 912-
13 (1971).
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In addition to establishing an unreasonable interference with
an interest, a plaintiff seeking to create liability for a nuisance
must also show that the unreasonable invasion causes substantial
harm."' The requirement of establishing a substantial harm, as
will be seen, is not as involved as proving the requisite unreasona-
ble interference with the plaintiff's interests.
The standard for determining whether there is a substantial
harm is objective and requires definite offensiveness, inconveni-
ence, or annoyance to the normal person or ordinary reasonable
man in the particular community rather than the persons who
happen to be using or occupying the land.2 ' Such an interference
or harm must be real and appreciable and involve more than petty
annoyance or slight inconvenience.2 ' While there is seldom any
difficulty in satisfying the substantial harm requirement where a
detrimental change in the physical condition of the land has oc-
curred, there is difficulty in finding a substantial interference
where the invasion entails only personal discomfort and annoy-
ance.' Application of the reasonable man test is decisive in the
latter situation.22 In applying this objective standard, the
"location, character and habits of the particular community are to
be taken into account in determining what is offensive or annoying
to a normal person in it.' ' 4
The continuance or recurrence of an interference is only one,
and not necessarily a conclusive, factor in determining whether the
harm is so substantial -as to amount to a nuisance.'2 Although any
single substantially harmful interference with a plaintiff's interests
caused by liability forming conduct subjects the defendant to lia-
"' E.g., Green v. Castle Concrete Co., 509 P.2d 588, 590 (Colo. 1973); Lynn
Mining Co. v. Kelly, 394 S.W.2d 755, 759 (Ky. 1965); PROSSER, supra note 6, § 87,
at 577; RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 821F (Tent. Draft No. 16, 1970).
I" E.g., Baldwin v. McClendon, 292 Ala. 43, 48-49, 288 So. 2d 761, 765 (1974);
Lamesa Coop. Gin v. Peltier, 342 S.W.2d 613, 616 (Tex. Ct. App. 1961).
Ii E.g., Watts v. Pama Mfg. Co., 256 N.C. 611, 619,124 S.E.2d 809, 815 (1962);
RESATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTs § 821F, Comment c (Tent. Draft No. 16, 1970).
"M RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 822, Comment g (1939); see Prauner v. Battle
Creek Coop. Creamery, 173 Neb. 412, 421-22, 113 N.W.2d 518, 524 (1962).
"' See RESTATEMENT OF ToRrs § 822, Comment g (1939).
22 RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORT § 821F, Comment e (Tent. Draft No. 16,
1970); see Kriener v. Turkey Valley Community School Dist., 212 N.W.2d 526, 535-
36 (Iowa 1973); Meat Producers, Inc. v. McFarland, 476 S.W.2d 406, 410 (Tex. Ct.
App. 1972).
"S PROSSER, supra note 6, § 87, at 580.
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bility,'2' a continuation or recurrence of the interference may be
necessary in order to cause substantial harm.'27
In summary, there are two primary prerequisites to establish-
ing a basis of liability for a nuisance. In order for there to be
liability under the law of nuisance the invasion must result in both
an unreasonable interference with and substantial harm to the
plaintiffs interests.2 8
REMEDIES
Once it is determined that a nuisance does in fact exist, the
focus of the court turns to the type of relief that is to be granted.
Generally speaking there are three remedies available to plaintiff:
(1) abatement by self-help; (2) damages; and (3) injunction.'2' The
cases make no distinction among the available remedies for private
and public nuisance. 3 '
The privilege of abatement of a nuisance by self-help is closely
related to the privilege of using reasonable force to protect the
exclusive possession of land from trespass. It may be resorted to
in an effort to protect those things which are of daily convenience
and use, require an immediate remedy, and cannot wait for the
cumbersome process of ordinary formal procedures.'"' The privi-
lege includes the use of any reasonable force in a reasonable man-
ner which may be necessary to eliminate the nuisance, but it is
abused where the damage caused by the abatement is dispropor-
tionate to the threatened harm.' The privilege must be exercised
"26 RESTATEMENT OF TORTS, Scope and Introductory Note to Chapter 40, at 223
(1939).
'1 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821F, Comment g (Tent. Draft No. 16,
1970).
' Confusion often arises when courts combine the above principles of liability
under nuisance with common law concepts embodied in certain labels found in the
law of nuisance such as absolute nuisance, nuisance per se and nuisance per
accidens. Use of these terms by courts creates confusion in the area of nuisance law
and often demonstrates judicial failure to grasp the basic principles. See generally
PROSSER, supra note 6, § 87, at 582-83.
M 1 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS § 1.30, at 89 (1956); PROSSER,
supra note 6, § 90, at 602; Rothstein, Private Actions for Public Nuisance: The
Standing Problem, 76 W. VA. L. REv. 453, 455 (1974).
110 Bryson & Macbeth, Public Nuisance, the Restatement (Second) of Torts,
and Environmental Law, 2 ECOLOGY L.Q. 241, 265 n.114 (1972).
"I Herman v. Cardon, 112 Ariz. 548, 551, 544 P.2d 657, 660 (1976) (quoting
PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS § 90, at 605 (4th ed. 1971)).
'22 PROSSER, supra note 6, § 90, at 606.
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within a reasonable time after discovery of the nuisance or after
the nuisance should have been discovered.'
Since the establishment of a nuisance deals with debatable
questions of reasonableness and substantial harm, the actor who
elects to abate a nuisance by self-help assumes a risk of making
an erroneous determination that a nuisance ever existed in addi-
tion to assuming a risk of using unreasonable force to abate the
nuisance. The fact that the actor has an honest belief that a nuis-
ance does in fact exist is no protection from criminal prosecution
or civil liability.'34
Before embarking on an examination of the legal and equita-
ble remedies available through formal action, it should be noted
that the failure of courts to distinguish nuisance as an action at
law for damages from the suit for injunction in equity has been the
cause of much confusion.' 35 Equity looks at the factual situation in
its totality and determines the appropriate remedy without much
regard to the legal categories of tort liability observed in cases at
law.'36 This disregard of legal classifications creates confusion when
cases in equity are cited as precedents in actions at law.' 7
The establishment of a nuisance is sufficient to entitle the
plaintiff to damages in an action at law, and no further balancing
of equities or of comparative hardships is necessary.13 The ques-
tion of the measure of damages requires an initial determination
of whether the nuisance is permanent or temporary. The concept
of a permanent nuisance, although vague, seems to involve a policy
determination that the defendant should be permitted to continue
the nuisance on a single payment of damages.'39 The following
factors will likely lead to the conclusion that the nuisance is per-
' Id. at 605. "[If there has been sufficient delay to allow a resort to legal
process, the reason for the privilege fails, and the privilege with it." Id.
134 Id.
M RE TATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRTs § 822, Comment d (Tent. Draft No. 17,
1971).
3 Id.; see Coleman v. Estes, 281 Ala. 234, 238, 201 So. 2d 391, 394-95 (1967);
Dutton v. Rocky Mountain Phosphates, 151 Mont. 54, 74, 438 P.2d 674, 684 (1968).
W RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRTS § 822, Comment d (Tent. Draft No. 1971).
'' PRossEa, supra note 6, § 90, at 603.
in D. DOBBS, LAW OF REMEDIES § 5.4, at 337 (1973) [hereinafter cited as
DOBBS]. Some courts look to the permanence of the damage rather than the perma-
nence of the nuisance. See Meat Producers, Inc. v. McFarland, 476 S.W.2d 406,
412-13 (Tex. Ct. App. 1972). Some courts hold that the nature of the nuisance
rather than the nature of the structure causing the nuisance is what is determina-
tive. See Lynn Mining Co. v. Kelly, 394 S.W.2d 755, 757 (Ky. 1965).
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manent: (1) the nuisance can reasonably be expected to continue
indefinitely into the future without reduction;'40 and (2) the nature
of the nuisance is such that a court of equity would not abate it
by injunction because of its value to the community or the rela-
tions between the parties.' The measure of damages for a perma-
nent nuisance includes the diminution in property value which is
calculated by determining the difference between the market value
of the plaintiff's property before and after the commencement of
the nuisance.
4 2
A nuisance which is abatable and not permanent in nature is
a temporary nuisance.' The measure of damages for a temporary
nuisance includes the diminution of the rental or use value of the
property for the duration of the temporary nuisance up to the time
of trial.' In addition to recovery for property damages, damages
for personal discomfort and inconvenience,' injury to health,' or
reasonable expenses incurred on account of the nuisance'47 may be
recovered by the plaintiff for either a permanent or a temporary
nuisance.' 8
140 DOBBS, supra note 139, § 5.4, at 338-39; Varjabedion v. City of Madera, 134
Cal. Rptr. 305, 309 (Ct. App. 1976); Nitram Chems., Inc. v. Parker, 200 So. 2d 220,
231 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1967).
141 See Reynolds Metals Co. v. Wand, 308 F.2d 504, 509 (9th Cir. 1962).
142 E.g., City of Tucson v. Apache Motors, 74 Ariz. 98, 101, 245 P.2d 255, 257
(1952); Vaijabedian v. City of Madera, 134 Cal. Rptr. 305, 309, 310 (Ct. App. 1976);
DOBBS, supra note 139, § 5.4, at 333.
"I Lynn Mining Co. v. Kelly, 394 S.W.2d 755, 758, 759 (Ky. 1965); DOBBS,
supra note 139, § 5.3, at 333; see Nitram Chems., Inc. v. Parker, 200 So. 2d 220,
231 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1967).
"I E.g., Lynn Mining Co. v. Kelly, 394 S.W.2d 755, 760 (Ky. 1965); Cooper Tire
& Rubber Co. v. Johnston, 234 Miss. 432, 106 So. 2d 889 (1958).
115 E.g., Kentucky W. Va. Gas Co. v. Lafferty, 174 F.2d 848, 851 (6th Cir. 1949);
Varjabedian v. City of Madera, 134 Cal. Rptr. 305, 309 (Ct. App. 1976); Nitram
Chems., Inc. v. Parker, 200 So. 2d 220, 225 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1967).
4I E.g., Dodd v. Glen Rose Gasoline Co., 194 La. 1, 193 So. 349 (1940); Greer
v. City of Lennox, 79 S.D. 28, 107 N.W.2d 337 (1961).
,' E.g., Varjabedian v. City of Madera, 134 Cal. Rptr. 305, 309 (Ct. App. 1976);
Greer v. City of Lennox, 79 S.D. 28, 33, 107 N.W.2d 337, 339 (1961).
,' Nitram Chems., Inc. v. Parker, 200 So. 2d 220, 225 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1967).
One attorney has listed seven basic categories of damages recoverable in air
pollution cases: (1) medical, hospital and related expenses for a person whose
health is impaired by reason of the pollution; (2) pain, suffering, and discomfort
sustained by such a person; (3) loss of consortium by the spouse of such a person;
(4) property damage including the cost of repair, replacement or correction of
damage and the necessary cost measures taken to prevent further damage; (5)
diminution in market value of the property for a permanent nuisance or rental value
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The determination of whether a nuisance is temporary or per-
manent also determines whether the plaintiff must bring a single
action for past and prospective damages or may bring successive
actions for the nuisance.' 4' If the nuisance is permanent, all dam-
ages both past and prospective must be recovered in one action,'50
but if the nuisance is temporary, successive suits may be brought
for the continuing interference and resulting damages.'5'
While damages may sufficiently compensate plaintiffs for in-
juries both past and future, such a remedy does nothing in the way
of ameliorating pollution.5 2 The possibility of recovery of punitive
damages, however, may provide a useful incentive for polluters to
take preventive pollution control measures since punitive damages
may be substantially larger than actual damages. Generally, puni-
tive damages will only be awarded in those cases where the defen-
dant's actions have been so flagrant that malice may be attributed
to him or where he has intentionally and continuously caused the
emission of pollution with a reckless disregard for others."' But the
trend appears to be toward a liberalization of the definition of
malice for purposes of punitive damages. In McElwain v. Georgia-
Pacific Corp.,"4 the plaintiff brought an action under the law of
nuisance for injuries suffered from toxic gases, fumes, smoke and
particles which blew onto his land from the defendant's paper mill.
The court stated that "[t]he intentional disregard of the interest
of another is the equivalent of legal malice, and justifies punitive
damages . . . .15 The court further held that punitive damages
would be appropriate if the defendant had not done everything
reasonably possible to minimize the damage to adjoining prop-
for temporary nuisance; (6) damages for loss of normal use and enjoyment of one's
property; and (7) damages for annoyance, inconvenience and discomfort. Hadden,
Civil Action Against Air Pollution, 49 MicH. ST. B.J. 34 (August 1970).
"I See, e.g., City of Tucson v. Apache Motors, 74 Ariz. 98, 101-05, 245 P.2d
255, 257-59 (1952); Varjabedian v. City of Madera, 134 Cal. Rptr. 305, 309 (1976).
'1 E.g., Reynolds Metals Co. v. Wand, 308 F.2d 504, 508 (9th Cir. 1962); City
of Tucson v. Apache Motors, 74 Ariz. 98, 101, 245 P.2d 255, 257 (1952).
"I E.g., Reynolds Metals Co. v. Wand, 308 F.2d 504, 509-10 (9th Cir. 1962);
Caldwell v. Knox Concrete Prods., Inc., 54 Tenn. App. 393, 406, 391 S.W.2d 5, 11
(1964).
1' See Claude v. Weaver Constr. Co., 261 Iowa 1225, 158 N.W.2d 139 (1968).
,5' Newman v. Nelson, 350 F.2d 602, 604-05 (10th Cir. 1965); Claude v. Weaver
Constr. Co., 261 Iowa 1225, 158 N.W.2d 139 (1968) (excellent discussion of malice);
see, e.g., Gorman v. Sabo, 210 Md. 155, 164, 122 A.2d 475, 478 (1956).
1' 245 Or. 247, 421 P.2d 957 (1966).
113 Id. at 249, 421 P.2d at 958; accord, Claude v. Weaver Constr. Co., 261 Iowa
1225, 1231, 158 N.W.2d 139, 144 (1968).
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erty. 15' The dissenting opinion compared the award of punitive
damages under such a liberal definition of malice to an injunction
issued without a careful consideration of the equitable values in-
volved and observed that punitive damages can often have the
same effect as an injunction. 57
Ordinarily, a plaintiff will couple his claim for damages with
a prayer for an injunction to abate the nuisance.' 8 There are a
number of reasons why injunctive relief is preferrable to a recovery
of damages. First, damages are often difficult to ascertain in a
pollution suit.' For example, what is the value, in dollars, of the
inconvenience and irritation suffered by persons or of the harm to
the health of persons living adjacent to a pollution exuding
factory? Second, even when damages are easily assessed, the ex-
pense of a recovery may very well exceed the amount recoverable,
especially where the plaintiff is only awarded temporary damages
and is forced to bring successive actions to collect further dam-
ages. "' Third, damages are poor social investments as they do
nothing to improve the quality of the environment and usually fail
to put an end to the pollution. If the defendant has paid permanent
damages, he may be encouraged to do nothing for he has already
paid the price to continue his pollution.'"' Even if the defendant is
faced with continual suits, he may find that it is less expensive to
pay damages than to install pollution abatement devices."' Fi-
'" McElwain v. Georgia-Pacific Corp., 245 Or. 247, 251-52, 421 P.2d 957, 959-
60 (1966).
,31 Id. at 261-62, 421 P.2d at 964-65. "[T]he burden of making compensation
to all persons injured may prove so heavy as to render it impractical to continue
the activity. In this case, the weighing process is more nearly like that involved in
a suit for an injunction." RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) oF TowTs § 828, Comment h (Tent.
Draft No. 17, 1971).
's See, e.g., Baldwin v. McClendon, 292 Ala. 43, 49, 288 So. 2d 761, 766 (1974);
Crushed Stone Co. v. Moore, 369 P.2d 811, 815 (Okla. 1962).
,", See Comment, Equity and the Eco-System: Can Injunctions Clear the Air?,
68 MICH. L. REv. 1254, 1256 (1970).
'" See text accompanying note 151 supra.
" In permitting the injunction to become inoperative upon the pay-
ment of permanent damages, the majority is, in effect, licensing a con-
tinuing wrong. It is the same as saying to the cement company, you may
continue to do harm to your neighbors so long as you pay a fee for it.
Furthermore, once such permanent damages are assessed and paid, the
incentive to alleviate the wrong would be eliminated, thereby continuing
air pollution of an area without abatement.
Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co., 26 N.Y.2d 219, 230, 257 N.E.2d 870, 876, 309
N.Y.S.2d 312, 321 (1970) (Judge Jasen dissenting).
"I "Mr. Shoemaker, Manager of appellant's plant, when asked why he didn't
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nally, while damages may only be recovered when harm has al-
ready been suffered, injunctive relief is available in a proper case
against the threat of future harm.
8 3
An injunction is an equitable remedy, therefore it must be
clear that the plaintiff has no adequate remedy at law, usually in
the form of money damages, before he may be entitled to injunc-
tive relief."41 If money damages will adequately compensate the
plaintiff for his injury, then injunctive relief should be denied."5
Usually, the determination of whether the legal remedy is suffi-
ciently adequate to preclude equitable relief is a matter left to the
court's discretion." 8 Damages, however, will often be deemed inad-
equate where: (1) the injury suffered cannot be accurately calcu-
lated in terms of dollars;"7 (2) the injury to the plaintiff is irrepara-
ble;' (3) the injury is continuous in nature;"' or (4) the usefulness
of the plaintiff's land is seriously impaired.' Since most pollution
use better fluoride controls, said: 'It is cheaper to pay claims than it is to control
fluorides.'" Reynolds Metals Co. v. Lampert, 324 F.2d 465, 466 (9th Cir. 1963), cert.
denied, 376 U.S. 910 (1964).
" PROSSER, supra note 6, § 90, at 603; see, e.g., Monsanto Chem. Co. v.
Fincher, 272 Ala. 534, 537, 133 So. 2d 192, 195 (1961); Sohns v. Jensen, 11 Wis. 2d
449, 462, 105 N.W.2d 818, 825 (1960). But see McQuail v. Shell Oil Co., 40 Del.
Ch. 410, 415-17, 183 A.2d 581, 584-85 (1962).
114 DOBBS, supra note 139, § 2.10, at 108; PaossER, supra note 6, § 90, at 603;
see, e.g., Christopher v. Jones, 231 Cal. App. 2d 408, 415-16, 41 Cal. Rptr. 828, 833
(1964); Harden Chevrolet Co. v. Pickaway Grain Co., 27 Ohio Op. 2d 144, 147, 194
N.E.2d 177, 180 (C.P. 1961). RESTATEMENT OF ToRTs § 938, Comment c (1939).
A plaintiff seeking an injunction need not demonstrate the inadequacy of other
remedies by prior resort to them. Id. § 934.
RU See Kriener v. Turkey Valley Community School Dist., 212 N.W.2d 526, 536
(Iowa 1973); Riter v. Keokuk Electro-Metals Co., 248 Iowa 710, 725, 82 N.W.2d 151,
160 (1957).
' DoBsS, supra note 139, § 2.10, at 110-11; see Harden Chevrolet Co. v. Picka-
way Grain Co., 27 Ohio Op. 2d 144, 148-49, 194 N.E.2d 177, 182 (C.P. 1961).
"I Developments in the Law-Injunctions, 78 HARv. L. REv. 994, 1002-04
(1965); see Costas v. City of Fond Du Lac, 24 Wis. 2d 409, 415, 129 N.W.2d 217,
220 (1964). It is often extremely difficult to measure the amount of harm done to
health, property and the environment in general. See, e.g., Reynolds Metals Co. v.
Yturbide, 258 F.2d 321, 323-26 (9th Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 840 (1958).
,13 See, e.g., Monsanto Chem. Co. v. Fincher, 272 Ala. 534, 537, 133 So. 2d 192,
195 (1961); Christopher v. Jones, 231 Cal. App. 408, 416, 41 Cal. Rptr. 828, 833
(1964); DOBBS, supra note 139, § 2.10, at 108, 109.
"I Borenstein v. Joseph Fein Caterers, Inc., 255 So. 2d 800, 805 (La. Ct. of App.
1972); Developments in the Law-Injunctions, 78 HIv. L. REv. 994, 1001 (1965);
see Monsanto Chem. Co. v. Fincher, 272 Ala. 534, 537, 133 So. 2d 192, 195 (1961).
"0 PaOSSEaR, supra note 6, § 90, at 603; Developments in the Law-Injunctions,
78 HARV. L. REV. 994, 1003 (1965); see Sullivan v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Co., 208
24
West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 80, Iss. 1 [1977], Art. 5
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol80/iss1/5
WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW
suits involve an invasion resulting in continuous, irreparable injury
where damages are indeterminate, the plaintiff will most likely not
be denied an injunction solely on the basis that his remedy at law
is adequate.
Establishment of an inadequate remedy at law is not enough
by itself, however, to entitle the plaintiff to injunctive relief. Upon
request for injunctive relief, the court engages in a second balanc-
ing process known as the doctrine of comparative hardships., As
noted above,'72 before the court finds that a nuisance does in fact
exist, it engages in a balancing process in an effort to determine
whether or not the defendant's conduct has resulted in an unrea-
sonable invasion of the plaintiff's interests. Once a nuisance is
found to exist, liability for damages is in order even though the
defendant's conduct may embody great utility and the amount of
harm suffered by the plaintiff is relatively small.' But for pur-
poses of determining whether injunctive relief is in order with re-
gard to the same conduct, additional factors must be considered.'
7 4
It may be reasonable to allow the continuance of an activity creat-
ing a nuisance by requiring the payment of damages, yet that same
activity might be deemed too important to be discontinued by the
issuance of an injunction.
75
Basically, the doctrine of balancing comparative hardships
involves balancing the relative hardships likely to result to the
defendant and society if an injunction is granted against the hard-
Pa. 540, 555, 57 A. 1065, 1071 (1904).
"I See, e.g., Harrison v. Indiana Auto Shredders Co., 528 F.2d 1107, 1122 (7th
Cir. 1976); Gunther v. E.I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co., 157 F. Supp. 25, 33 (N.D.
W. Va. 1957); DOBBS, supra note 139, § 5.7, at 357; PROSSER, supra note 6, § 90, at
604; RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 941 (1939). See generally, Note, Remedies-Private
Nuisance-Comparative Injury Doctrine in West Virginia, 77 W. VA. L. REv. 780
(1975).
72 See text accompanying notes 85-118 supra.
,' See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821B, Comment i (Tent. Draft No.
17, 1971).
"I City of Monticello v. Rankin, 521 S.W.2d 79, 81 (Ky. 1975); RESTATEMENT
OF ToRS, Scope and Introductory Note to Chapter 40, at 224 (1939).
"' RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821B, Comment i (Tent. Draft No. 17,
1971); see, e.g., Mountain Copper Co. v. United States, 142 F. 625 (9th Cir. 1906);
De Blois v. Bowers, 44 F.2d 621 (D. Mass. 1930); Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co.,
26 N.Y.2d 219, 257 N.E.2d 870, 309 N.Y.S.2d 312 (1970).
A plaintiff must meet a greater burden of proof to obtain an injunction as a
court is more likely to find that the defendant's conduct is unreasonable enough to
warrant damages but not so unreasonable as to warrant an injunction. Comment,
Air Pollution, Nuisance Law, and Private Litigation, 1971 UTAH L. REv. 142, 143.
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ships likely to be suffered by the plaintiff and society in the event
that an injunction is denied. 76 Obviously, the ultimate resolution
of this second balancing process will be fraught with the value
judgments of a particular judge with regard to broad policy ques-
tions facing the court. 177 Two polar views concerning the balancing
of comparative hardships are found in Whalen v. Union Bag &
Paper Co.' and Hulbert v. California Portland Cement Co.171 on
the one hand and Madison v. Ducktown Sulphur, Copper & Iron
Co.' 0 and Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co. 1' on the other.
Both Whalen and Hulbert were early twentieth century cases
in which the courts were unwilling to balance comparative injuries
to the detriment of the plaintiff landowners. In Whalen, the plain-
tiff was a lower riparian landowner situated on the same creek
upon which the defendant's pulp mill was located. The defendant's
mill represented an investment of over $1,000,000 and employed
somewhere between 400 and 500 persons. The mill, along with
other industries, discharged its pollutant by-products into the
creek and thereby substantially reduced the purity of the water.
The plaintiff owned 225 acres of farmland, the use and value of
which had been deleteriously affected by the polluted stream.
Although the court was well aware that the plaintiff's actual
injury from the continuance of the pollution emissions would be
small as compared to the great loss which would result to the
defendant by the issuance of the injunction, it, nevertheless, rein-
stated the trial court's injunction which had been denied by the
appellate division.' 2 While the court did not expressly embark on
a balancing of hardships inquiry, it did note that the plaintiffs
injury was not the only harm resulting from the defendant's pollu-
tion.
It can hardly be said that this injury is unsubstantial, even
if we should leave out of consideration the peculiarly noxious
character of the pollution of which the plaintiff complains. The
"' See, e.g., Gunther v. E.I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co., 157 F. Supp. 25, 33
(N.D.W. Va. 1957); Mahlstadt v. City of Indianola, 251 Iowa 222, 232, 100 N.W.2d
189, 195 (1959); RESTATEMENT OF TORTS §§ 936, 942 (1939).
'" See generally Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co., 26 N.Y.2d 219, 257 N.E.2d
870, 309 N.Y.S.2d 312 (1970).
"' 208 N.Y. 1, 101 N.E. 805 (1913).
"' 161 Cal. 239, 118 P. 928 (1911).
113 Tenn. 331, 83 S.W. 658 (1904).
"' 26 N.Y.2d 219, 257 N.E.2d 870, 309 N.Y.S.2d 312 (1970).
"A2 208 N.Y. 1, 3, 101 N.E. 805, 805 (1913).
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waste from the defendant's mill is very destructive both to vege-
tation and animal life and tends to deprive the waters with
which it is mixed of their purifying qualities.Iu
In its final analysis the court was unwilling to permit one
landowner, causing a nuisance which substantially injured another
landowner, to continue the nuisance even if he paid for continuing
the nuisance. The court stated:
Although the damage to the plaintiff may be slight as compared
with the defendant's expense of abating the condition, that is
not a good reason for refusing an injunction. Neither courts of
equity nor law can be guided by such a rule, for if followed to
its logical conclusion it would deprive the poor litigant of his
little property by giving it to those already rich."
In Hulbert v. California Portland Cement Co.,'85 the defen-
dant operated a cement plant which represented an investment of
$800,000 and employed around 500 persons at a payroll of about
$420,000 a year. The defendant incorporated the best, most mod-
em equipment and methods available in manufacturing its prod-
uct, but its plant continued to emit dust and smoke into the air
as by-products of the production process. The defendant had con-
sulted the best engineers and was making every effort to alleviate
the unavoidable emissions, and there was no other profitable loca-
tion fof the defendant to conduct its business. The plaintiffs were
adjacent landowners seeking an injunction to prevent the defen-
dant from operating its plant from which emanated dust particles
which formed an incrustation on all of the trees and plants growing
on the plaintiffs' lands in addition to adding discomfort to the
plaintiffs' lives by seeping into their homes. The deposits of dust
on the plaintiffs' citrus fruit decreased its value, and the deposits
on the limbs and leaves of the trees rendered cultivation and har-
vesting more costly than it otherwise would have been.
The defendant urged that "the resulting injuries must be bal-
anced by the court and that where the hardship inflicted upon one
party by the granting of an injunction would be very much greater
than that which would be suffered by the other party if the nui-
sance were permitted to continue, injunctive relief should be de-
nied."'' 6 After considering the question of balancing the compara-
' Id. at 4-5, 101 N.E. at 806.
Id. at 5, 101 N.E. at 806.
" 161 Cal. 239, 118 P. 928 (1911).
" Id. at 246, 118 P. at 931.
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tive hardships, the court affirmed the granting of the injunction.
The opinion of the court quoted with approval one of the strongest
rejections of the balancing process to date:
"Of course, great interests should not be overthrown on trifling
or frivolous grounds, as where the maxim de minimus non curat
lex is applicable; but every substantial, material right of person
or property is entitled to protection against all the world. It is
by protecting the most humble in his small estate against the
encroachments of large capital and large interests that the poor
man is ultimately enabled to become a capitalist himself. If the
smaller interest must yield to the larger, all small property
rights, and all small and less important enterprises, industries,
and pursuits would sooner or later be absorbed by the large,
more powerful few; and their development to a condition of
great value and importance, both to the individual and the
public, would be arrested in its incipiency." 8 '
On the opposite extreme of the position taken by the courts
in Whalen and Hulbert is found the position taken by the court in
Madison v. Ducktown Sulphur, Copper & Iron Co. "I In Ducktown,
the defendants, as a part of their manufacturing process, reduced
copper ore and thereby caused large volumes of smoke to be emit-
ted. These pollutants were disseminated by the winds to the plain-
tiffs' adjacent lands causing injuries to their trees and personal
injuries in the nature of discomfort. The defendants accounted for
approximately one half of the total tax base for the county in which
they were located and employed somewhere between 2400 and 2600
persons. The entire population of 12,000 people in the community
in which the defendants were located were dependent either di-
rectly and indirectly upon the defendants. The defendants were
using the only method known to reduce copper ore and had made
every attempt to eliminate the deleterious effects of the process.
It was further found that there was no location more remote to
which the defendants' operations could be transferred, and that if
an injunction was granted as prayed, the defendants would be
forced to cease operations and close down.
The court determined that the facts clearly set out a case of
nuisance entitling the plaintiffs to a recovery in damages, but it
denied the plaintiffs any injunctive relief after balancing the com-
parative injuries to the parties and the public. The court reasoned:
'" Id. at 251, 118 P. at 933 (quoting Woodruff v. North Bloomfield Gravel
Mining Co., 18 F. 753, 807 (C.C.D. Cal. 1884)).
"1 113 Tenn. 331, 83 S.W. 658 (1904).
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In order to protect by injunction several small tracts of
land, aggregating in value less than $1,000, we are asked to
destroy other property worth nearly $2,000,000, and wreck two
great mining and manufacturing enterprises, that are engaged
in work of very great importance, not only to their own owners,
but to the ...State, and to the whole country as well, to
depopulate a large town, and deprive thousands of working peo-
ple of their homes and livelihood, and scatter them broadcast.
The result would be practically a confiscation of the property
of the defendants for the benefit of the complainants-an ap-
propriation without compensation . . . . [I]n a case of con-
flicting rights, where neither party can enjoy his own without
in some measure restricting the liberty of the other in the use
of property, the law must make the best arrangement it can
between the contending parties, with a view to preserving to
each one the largest measure of liberty possible under the cir-
cumstances. '89
In Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co.,' 0 the New York Court of
Appeals, by adopting an approach similar to that taken in
Ducktown, overruled a long line of cases,' 9' beginning with Whalen,
which eschewed the balancing of comparative hardships doctrine.
In Boomer, plaintiff landowners brought an action against the de-
fendant for damages and injunctive relief alleging injury to their
property from dirt, smoke and vibrations emanating from the de-
fendant's plant. The defendant operated one of the world's largest
and most modem cement plants employing over 300 people with
an investment in excess of $45 million and using the best air pollu-
tion abatement equipment available.
The court found the ultimate question to be "whether the
court should resolve the litigation between the parties now before
it as equitably as seems possible; or whether, seeking promotion
of the general public welfare, it should channel private litigation
into broad public objectives." ' Although the court preferred to
defer the greater problem of air pollution to the legislative and
executive branches of government while deciding only the immedi-
ate dispute among the parties in the case, it tacitly engaged in
balancing the comparative hardships as justification for denial of
the requested injunction.
,89 Id. at 366-67, 83 S.W. at 666-67.
" 26 N.Y.2d 219, 257 N.E.2d 870, 309 N.Y.S.2d 312 (1970).
"' Id. at 223, 257 N.E.2d at 872, 309 N.Y.S.2d at 315.
192 Id. at 222, 257 N.E.2d at 871, 309 N.Y.S.2d at 314.
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The court considered two alternative remedies: (1) granting
the injunction but postponing its effect until a specified date in
order to give the defendant an opportunity to develop its technol-
ogy sufficiently to eliminate the nuisance and (2) granting the
injunction conditioned on the payment of permanent damages by
the defendant.'93 The court rejected the first alternative stating
that it would be unfair to place the burden of developing effective
pollution abatement equipment on a single corporation when such
a task would require the combined resources and efforts of the
entire industry.'94 On the other hand, the court believed that the
second alternative would properly compensate the plaintiffs for all
of their damages both past and future. 95 In addition the court felt
that it was "reasonable to think that the risk of being required to
pay permanent damages to injured property owners by cement
plant owners would itself be a reasonable effective spur to research
for improved techniques to minimize nuisance.""'9 In effect, the
court's ground for denial of the injunction, notwithstanding the
fact that there did exist a nuisance and that the plaintiffs suffered
substantial damage, was the large disparity in economic conse-
quences between sufferance of the nuisance by the plaintiffs and
enforcement of the injunction.'97
Although neither of the two extreme views represented by
the four previously discussed cases is the best alternative avail-
able, the two views, when considered together, point to an equi-
table, middle of the road approach.' When confronted with pol-
lution cases founded on nuisance, courts should balance the com-
parative hardships in determining whether or not to issue an in-
junction in order to maximize the public welfare, but they should
do so properly. Naturally, the hardships likely to be suffered by
the defendant as a result of issuance of the injunction, and by the
"3 Id. at 225, 257 N.E.2d at 873, 309 N.Y.S.2d at 316-17.
" Id. at 225-26, 257 N.E.2d at 873, 309 N.Y.S.2d at 317. The responsibility of
taking the lead in developing more effective pollution abatement equipment by the
defendant, a single corporation, may not have been so unfair as the court indicated.
It was pointed out by the court that the defendant operated one of the world's
largest cement plants of its kind. If the leader in a particular industry cannot be
expected to assume a prominent role in alleviating air pollution, then it can hardly
be expected that the particular industry will ever clean up its operations.
"' 26 N.Y.2d at 226, 228, 257 N.E.2d at 873, 875, 309 N.Y.S.2d at 317, 319.
"' Id. at 226, 257 N.E.2d at 873, 309 N.Y.S.2d at 317.
"9 Id. at 223, 257 N.E.2d at 872, 309 N.Y.S.2d at 315.
"' See Juergensmeyer, Control of Air Pollution Through the Assertion of Pri-
vate Rights, 1967 DUKE L.J. 1126, 1134.
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plaintiff as a result of denial of the injunction, must be consid-
ered.'99 Courts must not stop here, however, as public policy deci-
sions are based upon how the public is affected. Therefore, the
hardships likely to be suffered by the public in the event injunctive
relief is denied, in addition to the hardships likely to be suffered
by the public in the event injunctive relief is granted, must also
be considered."'9 It is at this juncture that the court in Boomer
erred in balancing the comparative hardships. In Boomer, the
court considered the hardships that would have been suffered by
the public had injunctive relief been granted, but it failed to con-
sider the hardships suffered by the public because of its denial of
injunctive relief. Thus, the court distorted the comparative hard-
ships balancing test in favor of the defendant.
Consideration of those public interest factors favoring refusal
of injunctive relief will often include the number of persons em-
ployed by the defendant, the tax contributions to the revenue of
the local community and state made by the defendant, and the
general boost to the economic well-being of the community pro-
vided by the defendant's enterprise."' It is noteworthy that all of
these factors can be broken down into dollar figures. Those public
interest factors favoring the grant of injunctive relief should in-
clude the deleterious medical, ecological and aesthetic effects on
the entire public resulting from continuation of the defendant's
operations. Of the three, the medical or public health factor is the
most significant.2 2 These public interest factors favoring the plain-
tiff are not readily broken down into dollar figures.
Thus, a major problem lies in the absence of a common de-
nominator with which to compare public interest factors favoring
the defendant against those favoring the plaintiff. Simply because
there is no easily derivable common denominator with which to
compare public interest factors, however, does not mean that those
factors not capable of being broken down into dollar figures should
"I Riter v. Keokuk Electro-Metals Co., 248 Iowa 710, 723-24, 82 N.W.2d 151,
159 (1957); D. DOBBs, LAW OF REMEDIES § 5.7, at 357 (1973).
See City of Monticello v. Rankin, 521 S.W.2d 79, 81 (Ky. 1975).
' See, e.g., Harrison v. Indiana Auto Shredders Co., 528 F.2d 1107, 1121 (7th
Cir. 1976) (defendant's contribution also included improvement of the environment
through its recycling efforts); Riter v. Keokuk Electro-Metals Co., 248 Iowa 710,
724, 82 N.W.2d 151, 159-60 (1957).
2 See Board of Comm'rs v. Elm Grove Mining Co., 122 W. Va. 442, 451-52, 9
S.E.2d 813, 817 (1940).
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be ignored as they were in Boomer. Ignoring such factors would
result in the absence of any public interest consideration on the
plaintiff's side in almost all cases. In an effort to aid the court in
balancing the comparative hardships of the parties and the public,
the plaintiff should offer as much empirical evidence and expert
testimony as possible which indicate the extent of the deleterious
effects caused by continuation of the defendant's operations.
When balancing the comparative hardships, it should be kept
in mind that injunctive relief is not a single remedy, but rather an
arsenal of remedies which is flexible in nature.2 The choice is not
one of simply closing a plant down or permitting its operation to
continue subject to the payment of damages. Various species of
injunctive relief may be adopted to a particular situation includ-
ing: an injunction requiring the defendant to apply existing tech-
nology to abate the emission of pollution;"' an injunction to take
effect after a set period of time, thus giving the defendant an
opportunity to eliminate the nuisance;" 5 an injunction prohibiting
11 Alfred Jacobshagen Co. v. Dockery, 243 Miss. 511, 518, 139 So. 2d 632, 634
(1962); see Webb v. Town of Rye, 108 N.H. 147, 153, 230 A.2d 223, 228 (1967); D.
DOBBS, LAW OF REMEDIES § 5.7, at 360 (1973); Developments in the Law-
Injunctions, 78 HARV. L. Rav. 994, 1064 (1965).
" See Renken v. Harvey Aluminum, Inc., 226 F. Supp. 169, 176 (D. Or. 1963);
Robichaux v. Huppenbauer, 258 La. 139, 152, 245 So. 2d 385, 390 (1971).
10 See, e.g., Renken v. Harvey Aluminum, Inc., 226 F. Supp. 169, 176 (D. Or.
1963); Alfred Jacobshagen Co. v. Dockery, 243 Miss. 511, 518, 139 So. 2d 632, 634
(1962); Webb v. Town of Rye, 108 N.H. 147, 154-55, 230 A.2d 223, 229 (1967).
An extension of time before an injunction takes effect might be allowed on a
showing of a good faith attempt to eliminate the nuisance. Proof of substantial
expenditures allocated to environmental research and development might be indi-
cia of such a good faith attempt. See D. DOBBS, LAW OF REMEDIES § 5.7, at 360-61
(1973); Developments in the Law-Injunctions, 78 HARv. L. REV. 994, 1064 (1965).
An alternative route might be to permit the defendant to try new means of
avoiding the nuisance while at the same time requiring the defendant to make
periodic reports back to the court or a master. If this approach does not too deeply
involve the court in the operation of a business, it may well afford an appropriate
solution to a sensitive controversy. A classic example of the effectiveness of this
approach occurred in Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230 (1907); 237
U.S. 474 (1915); 240 U.S. 650 (1916).
Defendants should not be permitted to rely on existing technology, however,
to justify their conduct. As stated by Judge Jansen in his dissenting opinion in
Boomer:
[Even though] the most modern dust control devices available have
been installed in defendant's plant, . . . this does not mean that better
and more effective dust control devices could not be developed within the
time allowed to abate the pollution.
Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co., 26 N.Y.2d 219, 231-32, 257 N.E.2d 870, 877, 309
N.Y.S.2d 312, 322 (1970).
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only that part of the activity which is causing the nuisance or
manner in which the activity is carried on;"'0 an injunction coupled
with an award of damages;27 or any variety of injunctive relief




Even when a plaintiff has established that he has no adequate
remedy at law and that the comparative hardships are balanced
in his favor, injunctive relief may still be denied where his miscon-
duct proves him unworthy of such equitable relief20 9 or where his
unreasonable delay in bringing suit operates to the prejudice of the
defendant.2 10 A plaintiff cannot expect injunctive relief when he
fails to come to court with clean hands. Thus, a plaintiff's miscon-
duct prior to suit, even though it does not amount to a crime or
tort, may cause injunctive relief to be denied if the misconduct
relates to the controversy over which the injunctive relief is sought
and if it is of such a nature as to render the plaintiff's interest
undeserving of injunctive protection. 2" For example, a plaintiff
who buys land, knowing that it is a dumping ground for debris
from a mine, primarily for the purpose of using the threat of in-
junction against the dumping of the debris in order to coerce pur-
chase of the plaintiff's land by the mine owner at an extortionate
price, will be denied injunctive relief because of his misconduct.
2 12
A plaintiff will also be denied injunctive relief where the de-
fendant successfully raises the defense of laches.2 13 Laches occurs
from the plaintiff's unreasonable delay in bringing suit even for a
period of time shorter than the prescribed statute of limitations,
2 See, e.g., Renken v. Harvey Aluminum, Inc., 226 F. Supp. 169, 172, 176 (D.
Or. 1963); Green v. Smith, 231 Ark. 94, 95-96, 328 S.W.2d 357, 358-59 (1959); D.
DOBBS, LAW OF REMEDIES § 5.7, at 360 (1973).
2" See Mandell v. Pasquaretto, 76 Misc. 2d 405, 410-11, 350 N.Y.S.2d 561, 567-
68 (Sup. Ct. 1973). "The most familiar application of these rules is found in a case
where a repeated or continuing tort is enjoined for the future and compensated in
damages for the past." RESTATEMENT OF ToRTs § 943, Comment c (1939).
21 "Within very broad limits, the court is free to adjust the interests of the
plaintiffs, the defendants and the public by devising an individually tailored rem-
edy to fit the particular case." Township of Hanover v. Town of Morristown, 108
N.J. Super. 461, 487, 261 A.2d 692, 705 (Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1969).
200 PROSSER, supra note 6, § 90, at 604; RESTATEMENT OF Toms § 940 (1939).
210 Stewart Wire Co. v. Lehigh Coal & Navigation Co., 203 Pa. 474, 478, 53 A.
352, 353 (1902); Madison v. Ducktown Sulphur, Copper & Iron Co., 113 Tenn. 331,
351-56, 83 S.W. 658, 662-64 (1904).
211 RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 940, Comment b (1939).
212 Id.
211 1 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, THE LAW OF TORT § 1.30, at 88 (1956);
RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 939 (1939).
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when he knew or should have known of the nuisance, and the delay
has operated to the prejudice of the defendant or has weakened the
court's facility of administration . 2 1 The defense of laches is similar
to the defense of a plaintiff's misconduct, the difference being that
in the former the plaintiff fails to take affirmative action to the
detriment of the defendant, whereas in the latter the plaintiff does
take affirmative action but to the detriment of the defendant.
Although there are a few hurdles which must be overcome by
a plaintiff seeking injunctive relief as a remedy to his sufferance
of a nuisance, the obstacles are not insurmountable, and the flexi-
bility of injunction as an equitable remedy offers the potential for
custom-fitted relief designed especially for the plaintiff's situation.
In addition, injunctive relief is a powerful tool available for use by
a court ingenious enough to use it, and it operates as an excellent
incentive to compel industry to develop effective pollution abate-
ment equipment.
PTFAUS OF A NuISANCE ACION
Although nuisance offers great potential with respect to abate-
ment of air pollution, many pitfalls await the reformer relying on
the theory of nuisance as a tool for resolving environmental prob-
lems. While many authorities may be cited for the proposition that
contributory negligence can never be a defense to an action based
on nuisance," 5 such an absolute statement is not completely
true."' Whether or not contributory negligence may be used as a
defense to a nuisance action will depend upon the type of defen-
dant's conduct which creates the nuisance '17 in addition, of course,
to the type of responsive conduct on the part of the plaintiff. 8
214 RESTATEMENT OF ToRTs § 939, Comment a (1939); see Coleman v. Estes, 281
Ala. 234, 238, 201 So. 2d 391, 394 (1967); Madison v. Ducktown Sulphur, Copper
& Iron Co., 113 Tenn. 331, 351-56, 83 S.W. 658, 662-64 (1904).
"I See PROSSER, supra note 6, § 91, at 608 n.11.
21 PROSSER, supra note 6, § 91, at 608; see Noebel v. Hous. Auth. of New
Haven, 146 Conn. 197, 203, 148 A.2d 766, 769 (1959); Albin v. Nat'l Bank of Com-
merce of Seattle, 60 Wash. 2d 745, 753, 375 P.2d 487, 491-92 (1962). But see Seavey,
Nuisance: Contributory Negligence and Other Mysteries, 65 HARV. L. REv. 984,989-
90 (1952).
27 See, e.g., Associated Metals & Minerals Corp. v. Dixon Chem. & Research,
Inc., 82 N.J. Super. 281, 305-06, 197 A.2d 569, 582 (1962); Young v. Groenendal, 10
Mich. App. 112, 116, 159 N.W.2d 158, 159 (1968). See text accompanying note 71
supra.
"I See generally PROSSER, supra note 6, § 65.
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In addition, a plaintiff cannot be too dilatory in bringing a
private nuisance action because the statute of limitations may be
raised, as in other torts, as an adequate defense. 19 Since a nuisance
is not established until an unreasonable invasion of the plaintiffs
interests causes substantial harm,2 ' the statute of limitations will
not begin to run until such harm has been incurred." '
Another pitfall awaits the plaintiff where two or more defen-
dants each contribute to the plaintiff's harm. Generally, when two
or more defendants, acting independently, create a nuisance from
air pollution emissions causing substantial harm to the plaintiff's
interests, the plaintiff has the burden of proving some definite
harm resulting from the emissions of each defendant. 2 While this
burden of proof may be difficult to sustain and will probably re-
quire the aid of expert testimony,223 the jury will have some liberty
in estimating the actual loss caused by each defendant."4 When
the defendants act in concert or breach a joint duty in creating the
nuisance, they will be held jointly and severally liable as joint
tortfeasors. 5 It should be noted that where a single, indivisible
harm is sustained as a result of the independent but concurring
acts of two or more defendants, there is an increasing tendency to
impose joint and several liability for the damage caused by the
acts. 26 It should be remembered, in such cases, that the harm must
be indivisible in nature and not practicably apportionable between
or among the defendants.
2 "
2i See, e.g., Lynn Mining Co. v. Kelly, 394 S.W.2d 755, 759-60 (Ky. 1965);
Riblet v. Spokane-Portland Cement Co., 41 Wash. 2d 249, 258, 248 P.2d 380, 384
(1952). See generally 1 F. GRAD, TREATISE ON ENVIRONMENTAL LAW § 2.02, at 2-23 to
-34 (1977).
The statute of limitations is not an adequate defense against a public nuisance.
See text accompanying note 47 supra.
21 See text accompanying note 119 supra.
22 1 F. GRAD, TREATISE ON ENVIRONMENTAL LAW § 2.02, at 2-33 (1977); see Lynn
Mining Co. v. Kelly, 394 S.W.2d 755, 758 (Ky. 1965).
m 1 F. GRAD, TREATISE ON ENVIRONMENTAL LAW § 2.02, at 2-40 (1977); see Smith
v. Pittston Co., 203 Va. 711, 715, 127 S.E.2d 79, 82 (1962).
22 1 F. GRAD. TREATISE ON ENVIRONMENTAL LAW § 2.02, at 2-40 (1977); see Food
Mach. & Chem. Corp. v. Meader, 294 F.2d 377 (9th Cir. 1961).
- 1 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS § 1.30, at 89 (1956); see Food
Mach. & Chem. Corp. v. Meader, 294 F.2d 377 (9th Cir. 1961); Smith v. Pittston
Co., 203 Va. 711, 127 S.E.2d 79 (1962).
2 1 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS § 10.1, at 692-93 (1956).
221 Id. at 693-94; see 1 F. GRAD, TREATISE ON ENVIRONMENTAL LAW § 2.02, at 2-
40 (1977).
1 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS § 10.1, at 694 (1956).
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If the defendant has been polluting for quite some time, his
action may have ripened into a prescriptive right to continue a
private nuisance.?2 In effect, the law rewards the defendant for his
patient and assiduous polluting. Applicability of this defense,
however, is limited to only those nuisances that are continuous, of
a constant amount and of an unvarying quality.2 9 Such a limita-
tion may very likely eliminate most defenses asserting prescriptive
rights since the emission of pollution will usually vary in degree
with changes in production.21
A final obstacle which may possibly trouble the plaintiff is the
doctrine of coming to the nuisance. Under the doctrine of coming
to the nuisance, one who takes up residence near an already exist-
ing nuisance must bear the consequences of the nuisance without
complaint.21 The defense of coming to the nuisance was first suc-
cessfully pleaded in England, in 1826, in the case of Rex v. Cross.
32
Beginning in 1838, the English courts gradually began repudiating
the defense of coming to the nuisance until finally it was said:
"[T]he old notion of people losing their rights of complaint be-
cause they come to a nuisance, has been long since exploded.
' 23 3
Although the doctrine is not universally accepted in the
United States,24 vestiges of it remain. In East St. Johns Shingle
211 Curry v. Farmers Livestock Mkt., 343 S.W.2d 134, 137 (Ky. 1961); Juergens-
meyer, Control of Air Pollution Through the Assertion of Private Rights, 1967 DUKE
L.J. 1126, 1136; Schuck, Air Pollution as a Private Nuisance, 3 NAT. RESOURCES
LAW. 475, 485 (1970); see, e.g., Hulbert v. California Portland Cement Co., 161 Cal.
239, 244, 118 P. 928, 930 (1911).
Prescriptive rights are applicable with respect to private nuisance but not
public nuisance. See, e.g., Fertilizing Co. v. Hyde Park, 97 U.S. 659, 668-69 (1878);
Smejkal v. Empire Lite-Rock, Inc., 547 P.2d 1363, 1365 (Or. 1976). See text accom-
panying note 47 supra.
222 See, e.g., Curry v. Farmers Livestock Mkt., 343 S.W.2d 134, 137 (Ky. 1961);
Koch v. Eastern Gas & Fuel Assocs., 142 W. Va. 386,403, 95 S.E.2d 822, 832 (1956).
2 See, e.g., West Ky. Coal Co. v. Rudd, 328 S.W.2d 156, 160 (Ky. 1959).
"I Grzelka v. Chevrolet Motor Car Co., 286 Mich. 141, 145, 281 N.W. 568, 570-
71 (1938); East St. Johns Shingle Co. v. City of Portland, 195 Or. 505, 246 P.2d 554
(1952).
The doctrine of coming to the nuisance is analogous to the doctrine of assump-
tion of the risk. See 1 F. HA"pER & F. JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS § 1.28, at 83 (1956);
PROSSER, supra note 6, § 91, at 611.
22 172 Eng. Rep. 219 (1826).
London, Brighton, & S. Coast Ry. v. Truman, 11 App. Cas. 45, 52 (P.C.
1885).
"1 1 F. GRAD, TRETIsE ON ENVIRONENTAL LAW § 2.02, at 2-24 (1977); Schuck,
Air Pollution as a Private Nuisance, 3 NAT. RESOURCES LAW. 475, 484 (1970).
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Co. v. City of Portland,2 5 the defendant municipality along with
other enterprises dumped its sewage into a slough. Later the plain-
tiffs began operating shingle mills, using the slough to transport
logs to their mills. The plaintiffs claimed that the sewage dumped
into the slough by the defendants increased their costs of opera-
tions by covering the logs, thereby constituting a public nuisance
from which they suffered special injury. u
The court denied the plaintiffs any relief, relying on the defen-
dant's defense of the doctrine of coming to the nuisance. The court
reasoned that granting the plaintiffs any relief would be inviting
parties to speculate about the purchase of property in the vicinity
of an existing operation with an eye to collecting damages out of
the harm created by such operation."7 The court did, however,
limit its decision to the factual situation where the defendant is a
municipality which creates a nuisance by an authorized govern-
mental function and where the plaintiff is operating an industrial
concern and has commenced operations after the defendant has
begun the operations causing the complained-of nuisance. The
court specifically denied a complete embracement of the doctrine
of coming to the nuisance.?8 In addition to the argument made by
the court in East St. Johns in favor of the doctrine of coming to
the nuisance, it might be argued that the doctrine prevents the
same speculators from forcing the defendant to repurchase the
land at an exorbitant cost.
39
The majority view rejects the doctrine of coming to the nui-
sance as an absolute defense to a nuisance action. 21 Support for
the majority view is found in the argument that the doctrine is out
of place in modern society where people often have no real choice
as to whether or not they will reside in an area adulterated by air
pollution.24 ' In addition, the doctrine is contrary to public policy
195 Or. 505, 246 P.2d 554 (1952).
2' Id. at 507-08, 246 P.2d at 555.
21 Id. at 525, 246 P.2d at 563.
z Id.
z1 See Note, Private Nuisance Law: Protection of the Individual's Environ-
mental Rights, 8 SUFFOLK U.L. REv. 1162, 1172 (1974).
240 E.g., Lawrence v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 81 So. 2d 632, 634 (Fla. 1955);
Watts v. Pama Mfg. Co., 256 N.C. 611, 618-19, 124 S.E.2d 809, 815 (1962); 1 F.
HARPER & F. JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS § 1.28, at 83 (1956); PROSSER, supra note 6,
§ 91, at 611.
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in the sense that it permits a defendant to condemn surrounding
land to endure a perpetual nuisance simply because he was in the
area first."' Another reason given for rejecting the doctrine is that
an owner of land subject to a nuisance would either have to bring
suit before selling his land in order to attempt to receive the full
value of the land or reconcile himself to accepting a depreciated
price for the land since no purchaser would be willing to pay full
value for land subject to a nuisance against which he is barred from
bringing an action.
24 3
Although the majority view rejects the doctrine of coming to
the nuisance as an absolute defense to a nuisance action, many
authorities support the view that it is a factor to be considered in
determining whether or not the defendant has caused an unreason-
able interference with the plaintiff's interests,2 44 or, more broadly,
that it is a factor to be considered in determining whether or not a
nuisance exists. 3 Such a position is untenable, however, because
the fact that the plaintiff owned the land prior or subsequent to
the defendant's creation of the complained condition is irrelevant
to whether or not the condition is a nuisance. Of course purchase
of land subject to a nuisance in bad faith by the plaintiff may bar
him from injunctive relief.
246
CONCLUSION
Nuisance is a powerful tool for the private litigant desirous of
resolving environmental problems. Although the problem of stand-
ing, the requirement of proving an unreasonable interference with
the plaintiffs interests, and the many defenses and pitfalls which
inconspicuously await the plaintiff create a significant threat to
the success of a nuisance action, these obstacles are not insur-
22 Note, Private Nuisance Law: Protection of the Individual's Environmental
Rights, 8 SUFFOLK U.L. REV. 1162, 1172 (1974); see Associated Metals & Minerals
Corp. v. Dixon Chem. & Research, Inc., 82 N.J. Super. 281, 306, 197 A.2d 569, 582
(1962).
2 41 CALIF. L. REV. 148, 149 (1953).
" E.g., Curry v. Farmers Livestock Mkt., 343 S.W.2d 134, 138 (Ky. 1961);
Watts v. Pama Mfg. Co., 256 N.C. 611, 618-19, 124 S.E.2d 809, 814-15 (1962);
Bryson & Macbeth, Public Nuisance, the Restatement (Second) of Torts, and
Environmental Law, 2 ECOLOGY L.Q. 241, 269 (1972); 1 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, THE
LAW OF TORTS § 1.28, at 83 (1956); 1 F. GRAD, TREATISE ON ENVIRONMENTAL LAW §
2.02, at 2-24 (1977).
2 See text accompanying notes 84-88 supra.
245 See text accompanying notes 209-12 supra.
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mountable and may be overcome. A private litigant intent on alle-
viating air pollution should not hesitate to include an allegation of
nuisance in his complaint. At the same time the private litigant
should be aware that other theories of recovery are available such
as actions based on trespass, negligence, strict liability, products
liability, stockholders' derivative suits, antitrust violations and
statutory violations.
Although salutary legislation is slowly engulfing the area of
environmental law, private citizens cannot afford to rely on the
initiative of government agencies to implement the purposes of
these new acts. Enforcement of environmental legislation is often
fraught with politics, capitalistic influence and bureaucratic apa-
thy, and the individual should not be forced to suffer the conse-
quences of such deleterious shortcomings. Availability of a nuis-
ance action to the private citizen is one bit of assurance that the
environment in which we live will remain livable; the existence of
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